tv 19th Chinese Communist Party Conference Politics Preview CSPAN October 6, 2017 9:34pm-11:06pm EDT
we'll have 15-minute break. take advantage thereof restrooms and refreshments during that time and come back for the next panel. please join me in thinking our presenters today. [applause] >> at that same event a discussion about the future of the chinese president and the communist party general secretary and his staff. the panel also took questions from the audience. this is about an hour and a half. >> by prior prior arrangements. good morning, everybody, thank you for coming. i'm alice miller, play rhythm guitar at the institution and aim the leader.
i'm grateful to doug paul for agreeing to host and set this thing up and the carnegie institution and alex taylor after all his logistical support. i'm grateful also to michael and to alan for their contributions to the monitor from very early in its inception and i'm sorry that james was pulled away. he is a founding contributor still writes for us and would have been the guy to talk about the reconfer racing -- reconfigure racing. and i'm grateful to joe and jessica for agreeing to do these presentations. we hope to have barry here who has been a founding contributor on the chinese economy, but barry has back loaded his class to end of the week and kind rearrange this schedule so i regret he wasn't able to come. i'm sure everybody knows who joe
is. professor at international relations and politics at boston university. he is founding contributor to the china leadership monitor, retired from our roster, i don't know, couple years ago we were arguing about when that was walking over here. and i'm glad he agreed to do this as a veteran stall wart contributor. he was one of the few guys who actually hit the deadline for drafts, which is, as editor, a question consideration for me. jessica batkey writes on govern attendance affairs, political reform and other related issues for the china leadership monitor, our in thest contributor. got to know jessica when she was brilliant m.a. candidate at stanford and i gather from her colleagues that she was a
terrific analyst at inr, he state department and is now working as a senior editor with china files in new york city. so i'm grateful to both of them for their contributions this morning. our order of battle will be jessica, joe, and then i'll try to contribute some wild thoughts at the end. myself and then open the floor to comments and questions. jessica, would you lead off, please. >> yes. thank you so much for having me. i'll say first i'm suffering from terrible jet lag so if i fall asleep while talking it's not because what i'm saying is boring. i assure you everything i'm about to say is thrilling but i ask that one of you guys throw something at me to wake me up. unfortunately the title of the this is demystifying the chinese leadership and i'm not sure i can do much to demystify. probably do more to mystify. so with that going in, i'll say up front, i look at governance
affairs and domestic social policy in china, and it's really hard to know how any given lineup that might happen -- of the politburo standing commitow out hoff party congress is going affect the overall trajectory of domestic social policy and that's because we don't know a lot about the potential candidate on the stabbing committee. the party does a good job of efacing personal details. they do a good job of detailing those in public and i think a lot of time wed fall victim to our own hopes and expectations about what we want to see in leaders. just because a leader speaks confidently and fluently with western interlocutors we like to think that means they're really open and secretly want the kind of reform we would like to see. don't think that's the case. or at least it's not often the case. and really good example of kind of projecting our hopes and desires and anticipations on to
leaders we dope node -- we don't know. jinping's father received a watch from the dalai lama many years ago and wore it for many years, and that was used as evidence that xi jinping would be much kinder and gentler. that obviously has not happened. so i think that story is a -- encapsulates we have so little information and we grab on to whatever we and can filter i through what we hope will happen. this isn't to say that it doesn't matter who is on the politburo standing committee. it does matter, people matter. it's hard to know how it's going for matter us i don't feel like i have good grasp on what any of these guys are thinking about any particular domestic policy. that said, unless something truly outlandish happens, like
jo decides to be a breakaway province or something crazy happens, it's hard to see how there are going to be any really major swings or u-turns in domestic social policy. i think before any party congress, everybody likes to say, okay, x thing happened, this ban of vpms in happened and tied to the 19th party congress. maybe, or maybe one of a series of steps and happens to be time sequential to the party congress. i was recently in china, and i -- there was some rumblings that maybe exactly this, the restrictions and vpms in were related to 19th party congress and would be lifted afterward. i don't see a lot of evidence that's happening. and the reason is because it's a questions -- they're not a lot of incentive to back off from the sorts of social policies they're working on right now and
if you look at information control and the internet. there was a article in september with a really, i think, important quote, that says if our party cannot traverse the hurdle represented by the internet ick cannot traverse he hurdle of remaining in power for a long time there might be slight spikes in terms of information control or internet control in china but i think the overall trend is pretty clear. i like to think of it as like airport security in the u.s. right? except it's actually effective. there's no incentive to be the guy who says, okay in my airport, we can stop taking off our shoes and going through the weird naked people scanner. that doesn't win you anything. if something actually happens you're on the hook for it. think of a lot of what is going on with social control policies and what we're talking about the internet in particular, in
that -- is in that vein. the different thing is that what they're doing is actually much more effective than our airport security here. it's achieving the goals they want, which is keeping most people away from most of the information they don't want them to see. i think we're going to continue to see codification or rule of law of a lot of long-standing social policies. we saw this very recently when they issued new religious regulations. this is an update to i believe 2004 religious regulation. we saw this last year with the release of both the charity law, which governs domestic ngos and the foreign ngo law which governs foreign ngos and we're seeing this with a bevy of restrictions on online communication right now. i think you could in general transfer that trend line across domestic policy. i think with regard to --
there's even less incentive to change or reverse course. at this point both of those areas are quasi-militarized. loads of people out there -- people's armed police out there. they managed to tamp down on self-immolations and attacks or at least news of self-immolations and attacks and i think they can wait it out until either people assimilate, people leave, go elsewhere in china, or there's just so few of them comparatively it just doesn't really matter anymore. so i don't real -- it's a question of incentives. don't see a lot of incentive for change there if they think they've got the situation, however unpleasant, more or less under control. so, because i've been given permission to go a little beyond my brief, i think what we should be thinking about now is this notion of domestic policy trajectory is more or less correct.
we should start to be thinking about the accident to which domestic poll and i internal affairs are actually playing out internationally. i think domestic chinese policy is being practiced beyond its borders. sometimes by the chinese and sometimes preemptively by us. i think there's long been the good example of this is the long-standing example of the dalai lama, people not wanting to host or meet with the dalai lama many times because of overt chinese pressure. in fact i think the dalai lama situation is a harbinger of now what we're seeing more of and what is to come. people willing to back down under overt chinese pressure and there's a sense in china there's more entitlement to levy that pressure against other governments and other individuals and groups outside of china. there's a really benign example of things like red dawn, the
movie supposed to be about the chinese -- u.s. and chinese con -- which was changed at the last minute bus of chin. you heard about the university press situation. of course this is when the china sent them a letter saying we would like you to censor these articles. they eventually reversed course after a big public outcry but because of this outcry is why we know about the incident and i have to assume there's a lot more happening that we don't hear about because they're quietly acquiesced to. also more recently, in terms of -- sorry. that lag -- another example i would say is -- a taiwan citizen who was put on trial because of
posings he was taken into trial but it was special media postings he made in taiwan on a nonchinese platform, facebook. so that's an example of chinese -- china implementing its domestic policy slightly outside of its borderment we should also think about the term that i learned back there in germany, and i'm sure professional european affairs scholars can tell me about it, but it's a term that means preemptive obedience and it's talking about what people who live in authoritarian states do and combining the will from what is hang at the top and then rushing to obey it before being asked to do so. i think everyone has heard stories of young academics in the west who very logically for their career decide not to work on controversial issues related to china so they can continue to get visas into china.
this makes sense. i think this is an example of this preemptive obedience and we don't really know how often it's happening. how many things people are doing without being asked. this is a long-stand practicing in authoritarian regimes but we should start thinking about how it's affecting people outside of china right now. it's hard to quantify and largely silence. i think also an increasing work by china to act outside i its borders on internal issues. we have seen if the cossacks, chinese citizens taken from egypt recently. china's chairmanship or heading up of interpol has raised a lot of issue, using red notices for other other countries to pick up political dissidents dissidentse picked numb hong kong and southeast asia for political reasons. i'll leave it limit don't have a solution to this. just think we should be thinking more about how chinese domestic
policy is affecting what we do outside of china. >> thank you very much. it's a pleasure to be back here. and as doug mentioned five years ago, alice and i did a program here just before the 18-inch party congress, and what we said was absolutely correct. at least that's how i remember it. actually, i hate to doing that's presentations just before the party congress because there's a chance that you might actually remember what we say, and say, joe you got that wrong again. they complained that when i invited him this time. in any case, i think the first thing that is interesting about this upcoming party congress is that we're paying so much attention to it. this is like china's mid-term election, right? and who paid all that much
attention to the 15th party congress? the big news of course was that tao was elevated to the successor position and that was kind of it. as far as the big news of that congress. it didn't draw that sort of attention, and if you look at the 17th party congress, 2007, that was a little bit more interesting. xi jinping and lee were elevated to the standing committee, and that set the tone for that -- the succession. this is i think drawing a whole lot more attention than either the 15th or the 17th party congresses did, and it's really because xi jinping seems to be something of a different animal. he has been shaking up the political system in china. i wanted to say in unprecedented ways but alice would say, but
that happened in 1934. at any case, he has been shaking up the political system. he's been setting new tones can new themes, think, and the anticorruption campaign, it's 150 so-called tigers which are defined as vice ministerial level and above. now, there might be, what, 2,000, 2500, people at that rank? so if you say, 150, that percentage-wise that's not all that much, but it's a lot of good percentage of active people. that includes 17 full members of the central committee. i do think that is unprecedented, at fleece reform -- at least in the reform era. includes 17 alternate members of the central committee. by the way of the full members
of the central committee, only four of those 17 had to retire by age limits, which means you have expanded the number of people who will retire normally by an additional 13 people. so that's an additional 13 slots that presumably xi jinping gets to fill. also, as i said, 17 members of the alternate list. so, it's been a very sweeping change, including in the military, which was referred to in the last panel, i believe, when lee chung wrote below the mill -- about the military changes a year ago, he had 56 senior military people who had been removed and just this year there have been an additional six or seven top ranked military people. so these changes do warrant the title, unprecedented. so, we really do have a major
changes, and i suppose one of the really important questions is to what extent is xi jinping breaking norms, institutions, of the party, and sometimes it's hard to tell because norms tend to be ambiguous, and this is something else, alice and i have the talked about more or less as long as we have known each other. at any case, one of those issues of course is whether or not he will name a successor at this party congress. it seems to me unlikely, but party congresses may indeed have surprises like that. i think the way to view this 19th party congress is sort of as a culmination of what we have seen over the last five years. that's certainly includes the anticorruption campaign. it also includes things we don't
pay as much attention to in the media, which is taking over critical positions. that certainly includes the military, but of course the first step was to take over the general office, which is sort of the -- it's lite the chief of staff and the secret service and the heartbeat of the system. you have also seen major changes in the ministry, state accurate, which is logical because that was so related to kong. you have seen less movement in the ministry of public security, which i find very interesting. the head of that -- this is a little inside baseball. this sort of thing that we like to watch as these party congresses happen. the minister of public security, his wife's grandmother was
hong's mother's little sister. you got that? i'm not going repeat that. but those are the sorts of things that makes you wonder about alignments in the political system and what happens and doesn't happen to people with this sorts of relationships. jung clearly was proposed by min for the number of time he was secretary of the ministry of electronics when min was minister of other few other relate associations. but then he worked with xi jinping for three years, and he was recently appointed party secretary of tiangen so choo be a politburo position. so that fits along with putting people that xi knows way in beijing, dai-chi and -- well,
jung is party secretary of shanghai. so, that's four politburo positions right there that he seems to have secured for his friends. and any any case, obviously the discipline inspection commission is another vital organize which san has been there as comrade in arms and so forth. and we have seen him promoting an unusual number of close associates. i guess we say unusual because they're easier to tack because he didn't seem to have a wide ranging network of people, and so when people have worked with him and they move up the ladder, ming has gone up four our five positions you say that's pretty obvious, that he i promoting
friends. this is really quite interesting to see how xi, who came to power really with no particular visible power base, kiss probably why five years ago we predicted he would be very cautious. he has manage to in fact build the power base rather quickly, at least beyond my expectations. i think the reason he has been doing this, the reason he can do this, is because five years ago the party really faced serious crises. that crisis was the apparent alliance between him and kong, w ah and ho, and that is something that xi jinping himself has called a political conspiracy. that's really extraordinary, to
have a major civilian authority apparently in some way, shape or form -- we don't know the details -- conspiring with the vice-chairman of the military affairs commission. that's really quite extraordinary. and so this gets you into an issue of the norms. my reconstruction of it, which is purely my own fantasy. have no factual basis for this be there is some circumstantial evidence. remember the two weeks where xi jinping disappeared. cancelled an appointment with hillary clinton and disappeared. the only rumored explanation is he hurt his shoulder swimming. the water was unusually hard that day. whatever the reason what. and then of course after that, shortly after that, his disappearance came three or four days after wah was removed from
the centrals of and moved to united front department which suggested the party had some issues to deal with. and my guess is that xi jinping went and had a number of meet examination phone calls that said, look, this corruption issue -- the conspiracy issue is really serious, and you need to give me a strong hand to deal with that. and my guess is that other people said, yes. so it's this falling party norms or not? seems to be following certaining permissions, when they gave permission did they really mean 150 tigers would go down and 1.14 million other cadres being burn issued? raises questions about what we moon by norms and that's what i mean about them being ambiguous. just after the 18th party
congress that the bowling pins began to fall. chung was the first major one help was deputy party secretary and an associate of kong, raise interesting questions about the chinese political system. kong muss have seen this and shade they're coming for me. it was two years to go up the trail to get to expunge there's nothing he can do about it. fascinating he just had to sit there and wait for the trail of evidence to pile up and get him. so, okay, that is one major crisis. actually i think one of the last articles i did for china leadership monitor a couple years ago was tracing a lot of the factionalism in the professors which is where wah was from and became very obvious you have these tight networks of power and money, locationally
based. chung area, which is where wah was from. promoted people. and it's just -- you had these, what, stovepipes of power relations there, and became quite obvious that the central government -- it was not just under jinping but previous government -- would send in leaders to run and it there's nothing they dock. it's so toothily -- tightly controlled. you can't stick an awl in it. so, xi jinping, two years ago when i wrote that article, there were over 15,000 cadres who had been replaced. that is trying to make the province respond. when i ask you to do something, you do it. exertion of control we haven't -- don't see very often.
then there was the fear that xi jinping made i think very palpable of the ccp following the cpsu into the dust bin of history. remember the first trip he makes out of beijing is to -- and says why did a great power, great political party, collapse? because people lost their faith and their confidence in the system, and i think that everything that we have seen since reflects that determination to revive the party and make it strong and responsive. so, xi is really all about the party. only the party can save china and only xi jinping can save the party. something like that. so what's going to happen at the 19th party congress? let me good out on a limb a little bit here. obviously all the eyes are going
to be on the standing committee of the politburo. my assumption is that we will continue to have a seven-person politburo standing committee, but even that is subject to change. i remember being in beijing in january of this year, and the rumor then was that you'd go back to having one party chairman and two vice-chairman, and even at that time it struck me that is one of this bargaining ploys youch don't like my personnel arrange.s, i'll just do it all. in any case there's been a lot of rumors bat what is going to happen, but i think the chances are that it will remain at seven. my guess is that shan will retire and everybody -- it will probably be because -- well, for a variety of reasons including age and maybe xi jinping would
like to run things himself. somebody mentioned his desire for control. my guess is that chong we stay on at premiere mitchell guess is chong that continue to have very little to do with economic policy. and i think the only thing that outside observers steam agree on is that shu will move towel the standing committee. he is on the politburo. head of the general office. he will certainly move up to the standing committee, perhaps to replace shan as head of at the discipline inspection mission and. a couple of other positions he could go to. the interesting thing is that unlike past congresses, there are ten people, other than shu, on the politburo, the full body, who are age eligible to move up
to the standing committee, and unless you extend the standing committee to what would that be -- 12 -- i don't think they're all going to be elevated to the standing committee. this gives xis' flexibility. now, if we do things according to past practice, they'd all be moving up the -- by age so there are number of people who are 67 years of age and, therefore, age eligible, but anybody want to take a bet on chau's being elevated? i would not count of that one. lon cannot move up because she is a girl and as alice would say you don't allow girls in the boys' clubhouse. yon is military you. 'll have some moving other people up from the standings
committee. i think one interesting question is who will replace lee as executive premier. yon seems to be a popular choice, jung is another viable choice. these personnel choices will matter good deal. some believe that wah, the young secretary will make it. just doesn't seem likely to me because, one, it would be naming a successor, or at least everybody would jump to that conclusion, and, two, xi has gutted the communist youth league of the last favor greaser and seems unlikely he would promote a product of the communist youth league to the standing committee. but anyway, it's fun to play these games. i'm sure that there will be some surprises. it's possible that xi will reach down in the party system and bring up somebody who is not on
the politburo. that would be a surprise and something that we would -- i don't know -- write a new china leadership monitor article about. give us something to do. at any case, -- oh, the other issue which alice just wrote a clm article about is whether xi jinping will get his name the party charter, and if so, what name -- how it will be described. i'm pretty sure he will get his name in the party charter but whether it will be thought or some other thing, one is alice points out matters, but if it is -- which would seem to put him on a par with mother mao tse-tung, that says i'm not retiring. if you are the font of all political wisdom it seems to me pretty hard to retire. at any case, that's -- only have
to wait two or three weeks to find out if any of these speculations are true. so if the last five years have really been about consolidating power, what happens over the next five years? this where is i can really stick my foot in my mouth and chew vigorously. what really expect is to have xi trying to set out something of a more positive agenda, what he -- to sort of define what he means by the china dream. and i don't know exactly what this will take, but i think you're going to get a clearer sense of what you mean by the post-dung period. going to try to give some definition to that. i think that -- remember when we were talking -- what -- a year or two ago about the two 30-year periods. xi jinping had this long thing
about there had been two 30 year periods. the mao era and the dung ear ya. they did not seem to count for very much but when you have had the two 30-year periods, i think everybody at the time thought, what you're doing is clearing the decks for the third 30-year period, and that will be the xi jinping era. and i think that is -- this is my speculation. think that's what xi is about, is defining that next period of, what -- if -- mao era is, what, building socialism or the revolution. the dung era is about prosperity and now the 30 year is something about what china role in the world -- what is its domestic policy. it will be defining that. think xi has given a lot of indication that he's going to try to draw on chinese's cultural tradition to do that.
that doesn't mean that he's going to go back to confucius. he has 2,000 year of practice on this. so, -- but i would also argue that it's different -- remember when confucius' statue showed up in tianimen tianimen square. i don't think xi jinping like that because that said the revolution was perhaps not important, illegitimate, something like that. think he has trade to reaffirm the revolution. that's part of the two 30 year period and the mao -- 120th 120th anniversary kim enemy racing and then the socialist core value. so you affirm these very clearly and then bring in china's cultural tradition behind that, and i think he's been pretty clear about doing something
along those lines. i don't see that as anti-western but die see it as trying to define something that is a distinct chinese path. different from not necessarily hostile to but something that should be defended against the terrible western values. they are terrible according to the academy of social sciences. we have had several books out now on the critique of neoliberalism. i don't know what neoliberalism is, but any case, the critique of western constitutional government, the critique of civil society, and the really critical one is the critique of historical anihilism. that's a term that doesn't roll off the tongue very quickly and easily but that means don't do good history. do propaganda.
don't want to go back in the archives and find out what the chinese communist party was doing in various periods in the past. in any case, that is going to try to define a chinese path that is distinct from we were liberalism and i think that's what you're going to see in the ideologyical realm. i think i've overshot my time but the implications of what we are seeing, i think, is a very strong tendency towards centralization of political power, and with that goes i think one of the really difficult challenges, which is the lack of innovation at the local level. seems to me that in past years local party secretaries have been begin a little greater freedom to address their problems through a variety of experiments, some included what
wassailed interparty democracy, including some election ted township level. those have all stopped. so local party officials now have i think less room to innovate and i think that is a problem because they do face problems, and the solutions seem to have to come from beijing, not from the localities. and as jessica mentioned we'll see continued control over thought, those sorts of things, and it's sort of strange because the chinese society is just simply more pluralized and diverse than it's ever been and the central government seems to be more centralized and less innovative and controlling than in recent areas, and that up the contradiction for the 19th
19th party congress when i assume we'll be back. >> thank you. thanks, joe. >> i good get to wrap up things here. let me just declare at the outset i should be regarded as the sarah palin of chinese leadership because if you follow what is said about checkpoints leadership politicked by the larger china-washington community and the lame stream media i can be characterized as going rogue and getting all mavericky. so, my views on the chinese leadership dough part from much of the kind of conventional knowledge you hear about. i'll suggest that i see a basically two lines of interpretation. dare i say a two-line struggle over how to interpret what is going on in the xi jinping leadership, and what it represents for the evolution of the chinese political system and my expectation, might be a
little with guidees that perhaps the 19th congress with offer an opportunity to evaluate whether their of those two lines is valid or not. it may be a misplaced hope, is a suggested earlier, still trying to offend out what really haven't with the affair in 1971. questions you never get the answer to. but that is the situation. what i'm calling the predominating interpretation in this two-line struggle, what refer to as bourgeois reactionaire line which includes self basic points. first, pinning jinping consolidated power more rapidly and thoroughly than anyone sing mao tse-tung. he was been building a cult of personality which has been banned in party regulation since 1980. end the collective leadership structure and followed an elaborated by -- and then hugh jintao. certained crawl over all the major policy sectors.
the chairman of everything and dominated the old central leading small groups and created new ones now that he has taken the helm of. there's a maoist cast to his policies. for example, the 213 mass line campaign and other approaches, for example to purging adversaries. he has deployed an anticorruption campaign to weaken and eliminate factional rivalries and the larger dynamic of politics is largely explained in term odd the power struggle, driven by factionalism, and xi has been successful in knew thattizing faction associatedded with jintao's youth, and in some xi jinping is china's most powerful leader, certainly since dung xiaoping and since mao tse-tung. i have a lot of reservations about the picture in some cases
quite severe itch couldn't see xi jinping as a maoist. i may be -- maybe except for joe -- the only person here who has read all 79 of the speeches and talks, and xi jinping's book on governing china but i did read them all and i've gone through and it quite detail. he does mention mao here and there. usually to say his poetry, but as you count the references and the substantial references to xi jinping, they're all over the place, and so it's very hard for me to see xi jinping's a maoist jump see no reference to any therefore ideal predilections of mao, class struggling continuing, making leaps in development without regard to the objective economic conditions or a readiness to go outside the party to rally society, to attack the party. this is the last thing this leadership wants to do.
also, xi jinping just isn't chairman of everything. what cited as his leadership of leading small groups. x leadings only two hormuz that jintao did, those are the super group, the leading small group for comprehensive deepening reform. that group xi does preside over. don't know who accepted the general secretary would do that because it covers seven areas of reform laid out in 2013, and three members of the standing committee sit assever vice-chairman or vice directors. you have a majority of the standing committee at the meeting. the other is the internet group that was also set up. people like to point out that the state security commission or national security council or however you translate that, but that's an upgrade. substantial upgrade of the
national security leading small group that jintao chaired. this perception that his command of everything i think doesn't stand up under closer scrutiny. and the factional approach to chinese leadership politic its endorse. i grew up in the good old dade of factional conflict in mao and the dung period but factional conflict has not caught up with the changes in the the political order and joe did a brilliant article in the monitor he mentioned that does apply this approach to understanding significant elements in leadership politics but more broadly the kind of analysis that many have done, chung's, for example, arrangement of one party, two coalitions or however the describes. it has to keep dating it. doesn't stand up well. so while i endorse the idea of factional politics we decent do it well because the leadership
has made a very concert effort to bury the differences that used to be easy 0 sort out in the good old days of leadership analysis. the biggest planet about this approach, doesn't tell you anything about policies. doesn't explain where policy comes from who advocates what policy and so forth. so it's a sterile approach to understanding politics and certainly in washington, dc, people want to know about policy and what his roots are and what its implications are. they don't care who is up or down unless it has connection to policy. if. impatient with this argue. in part because much of the evidence adduced to xi's supreme court seems to me to be invertible or reversible. example, if he is so powerful how come he needs to many eitel? mao didn't have many title, dung xiaoping didn't either. they had the two most important ones, dung's case, member happy 0 a standing committee and chairmanship of the central
military commission. why does xi jinping need so many title? s dung resisted getting tights. in 1980, says he should become party chairman and he turned it down and wanted the post abolished, which they need 1982. how come he gant get anything done if he is so powerful? we hear all the time these days -- i think there's broad consent this the reform package has not gone so far. so if he is so damn powerful how come he can't get these things done? what we hear the press is complains of the opposite, vested interests in the system or blocking success and we need moral centralized power. if xi has absolute shoulder support of the army why do they stress the absolute loyalty to the party, particular imfa size, why heading into the
december 2015 organizational reform in the pla -- i was glad to hear michael and doug and alan talk about this, the scope of the changes in military organizations are wrenching and changing careers elm missions people are responsible for and therefore affecting the prospects of the officer corp 'in r.ing whys. why did they need to emphasize and convene a conference in november 2015? the eve of these reforms to stress to the loyalty of the mayor to the paint and white does xi jinping need a chairmanship system to focus authority over the army, into the cmc and under his personal control. all of these things strike me not as indications of jinping's supreme power but rather the insecurity of the broader leadership over the compliance of the army and more broadly
over the country. what toe -- what to do with this? fortunately we have the revolutionary analytical loin. my chinese surname is may so it's chairman may's revolutionary line if didn't want to say editor may's but whatever. this is line i have set out in successive issues of the china leeway -- china leadership monitor and says the overarching agent jinping'ing has pursued since 2012 was set down in the report delivered by hu jintao at the congress, and so this became visible with a series of comprehensive reforms laid out in the 60-point decision endorsed at the third plenum in november 2013. the agenda was set down there femurly, which i suggest
reflected a broader leadership consensus behind the new xi leadership to push through reforms in part -- mainly because the second hu jintao term was a period of relatively clear paralysis in the leadership and its ability to decide major policy to deal with obvious problems and joe and i disagree on overanning arc of the hu jintao term from 2002 to 2012 and we agree the second term after '07 is a term when relatively little was decided and accomplished, despite several clear problems the leadership needed to deal will. so the congress tried to set down a consensus policy agenda and implant a new leadership, authorized to pursue it. these were formulated under the overarching goal to be completed by 2020. making china into a -- what do
you call that -- okay. that goal was first set down in 2002 in the report to the 16th 16th party congress. it was strongly reaffirmed to the 17th congress in 2007 and again in 2012 at the 18th 18th congress, and it's laid out a set of guidelines and policies that were reaffirmed across the the successful party congresses that framed the policy agenda of each term of leadership under huh untau and now xi jinping, expect the 19th congress will strongly re-affirm this 2020 goal. we'll see new push behind reforms that were late out in 2013, perhaps new reforms and certainly energy behind several of the old ones, and xi jinping 's 26 july peeve to the school was built around the theme, renewed impetus behind
the goal. it also leads to this third period in prc history that yo was just mentioning and that is to say this 2020 goal will be completed under jinping's leadership, i'm assuming he'll be re-appointed as general secretary and they're already thinking about laying out the guidelines for the second goal, which is enunciationed in 2002 and that's the 2049 goal the so i expect a strong re-affirmation of the policy agenda of achieving a moderately prosperous society by 2020 and then the initial guidelines to do in the pert to 2049. i agree with the previous panel i don't expect xi jinping to be gent secretary in 2049 so that we can all agree on. the congress in 2012, fleece my view, gave the xi leadership, not just xi jinping, the tools
it needed to pursue this policy mandate and included first an authorization of effort to revitalize and centralize the party apparatus to make it a much more effective driver of policy than it was in -- new the hu leadership and. second, far reaching campaign against corruption and on party work style to accomplish this same goal but also to attack vested interests that are aimed at reform. it's xi jinping doesn't have 750,000 factional enemies out there that are the target of this campaign. it's much to big to be simply that. this is an effort to restore the vitality of the party. and, third, they agreed to a stronger role for the general secretary to break policy deadlocks that seemed to plague the second hu jintao.
term. xi jinping is not a mao-like powermonger. the his speeches seem 0 to be thoroughly consistent with the approach that dung xiaoping untook in the post mao period and so forth. the hallmark theme, again irread all the speech inside the xi governance book has been constraining power in a cage of institutions and he is in my opinion upholding the basic norms that have developed across the reform period, and pressing to enforce them. he was named core of the sixth plenum last year but what people forget about the idea of the core leader is that when xi
jinping says a collective leadership needs a core, and the idea of a core notice contradictory to the idea of a collective leadership. at least in principle. and it wasn't accidental, think, therefore, that in bestowing the tiedle of core, xi jinping at the sixth plenum of the party also revises the party regulations 1980 to strengthen provisions for collective leadership, strongly reaffirming it. so, in sum, to me the watch wedder of the xi highway is not confidence instant around the person, it's rather insecurity. see the leadership has worried it if can't push these reforms through the party is in jeopardy of losing its grip on power and the entire regime sinking and this is the message that as joe was suggesting, the lesson of the collapse of the cps and the soviet union, this is a party that lost its way, that did not
have leadership of sufficient steel to maintain discipline and push through the kinds of policies that a party like a communist party ought to be able to do. so, in sum, i think the question of whether or not xi jinping is the most powerful leader since dung xiaoping or mao is misplaced, i'm inclined to think that he is certainly the most powerful leader since hu jintao and he has been saddled to complete a project that the broader leadership sees as critical to the regime's survival. and so looking at the congress, expect to see this as an opportunity to clarify, and maybe assess whether either of these two interpretations in this or two line struggle makes sense or has any validity. what should we watch for? i write on party affairs, joe
has put forward his suggestions on what we should see. first, how will the party constitution be revised? it's already clear, they have already said in chinese media, that the four comprehensives and the five major development con sents will be written into the party constitution. presume this will be in that section lower down in the preamble where they review what the current party leadership outgoing leadership, in this case the 18th leadership, has done. and that may come with hu jintao's name attached it. whether they add to the party's guiding ideology, i think is a trickier question, and if i were pushed to make a guess, i suggest i think no. i think this will await until '22 and the party congress. will xi jinping get another title? how many does he need, guess. but there has been suggestion that he'll take the title of
party chairman. no. that's not going to happen. period. is the party leadership structure going to get changed? there's been suggestions along with restore chairmanship we ol' reappear legislation is of the standing -- abolition of the standing committee. i don't see that happening and whether it was floated as you suggest as a kind of a move in the chess match preceding the congress or whatever, don't think it's going to happen. thrill be a successor to change jinping's place in 2022 and 2023. think the will be. i'm basing this simply on norms and of course this is one of those ones that might not work that way. ...
have to face the political confrontation and conflict. already people will start to rally not to circumvent this and prevent it. while not wait till 2022. i think joe is absolutely right in saying this, at least on previous occasions, she doesn't have to remain ahead of the party after he retires in 2022. he will be a powerful leader behind the scene and can affect his influence. i agree with that. i'll go even further out on a limb and suggest they will name two successors. my instinct is, and it's really total speculation h you would be the successor for
party leader and chung would be the candidate for prime minister. he looks like a prime minister. he's been praised in the press for his innovation to help the economy and this is the sort of thing you associate with prime minister. he has been a party leader and sector position in the province in china for a while. i just, that's what i expect. i will probably be wrong. another thing to look for, will the committee be appointed as it has been for the past for congress on the basis of seniority among the surviving members of the not retiring members. that's the way they've done it. they've changed the age criterion in 2002 from 7268. with the exception of success in training, every new one has
come from that most senior cohort within the non- retiring members. i expect they will do that this time and i think joe's calculations are right, the group includes. [inaudible] in the military and they haven't done that since 87. i don't understand the objection to him. they have attacked people he worked with, but he is a brilliant guy. he's a mathematician of the highest human calling. why you wouldn't want somebody like that, i don't know. but i go along with joe's analysis. another is in a caretaker
position and i suspect he will retire. i assume, like joe we will see seven members, two will be successes in training and that leaves three. i don't think, i had a bet with jeff and he was saying that he was gonna make it to the standing committee and i bet know when i got one right. i suspect he won't be this time. he's just too young. he's the next cohort. we will see him in 2022. that's the pattern and i will stick my neck out and say they will continue that approach. the age criterion will continue with 68, i think yes. if you move it up to 69 to accommodate whatever else, it opens the door for other people to say why do i have to retire and this invites a
struggle that i think the leadership in its position wants to avoid and that does mean i think they will retire and stay on as prime minister. finally i expect collective leadership to be a reaffirmed as the core leader. that's my two cents for whatever there was an maybe i should offer you a chance to comment. >> i guess i would say i probably come down on the side that i expect him to retire as well because i feel like upending too many of these norms would be more destabilizing than not. one thing i want to say about appointing a successor issue because i feel like this is in the press a lot and it drives me a little nuts is this notion that if a successor is
appointed then she's one of political victory. no, sorry, reversed. if it's not appointed, she's one of political victory if there is one appointed then he lost but i think that assumes way too much knowledge. if anybody has talked to him and knows for sure what they're planning, i'm right here. we can talk "after words". i feel like just because the successor is appointed doesn't mean she lost. we don't know that his goal the whole time was to not appoint a successor but that seems to be a lot of the win loss dichotomy that's been set up in a number of these news articles recently. >> images, that you said it sort of two bottles and you're forgetting about my hero leo, and it's really time to bring out how to be a good communist. that's what they are about.
>> i totally agree. the used to talk in the culture of evolution. it wasn't part of that and he said he was. okay. all right. let's open up the floor for questions, comments from anyone. as before, wait for the microphone to come around to you and tell us who you are much question is. we have one here. >> my name. [inaudible] i have a question regarding. [inaudible] i want to know about, do you think the role be institutional changes and policy changes in china, especially power distribution. there are a lot of rumors thing that they are not
playing. [inaudible] to think this will continue after. thank you. >> thank you for the question. it would've been a better question to ask when michael was here and you should ask doug to answer this, but so many questions are up in the air with regard to the cmc and how it's organized, and therefore how it will operate. it's going to be reconfigured in ways that may reaffirm the elemental struggle or the basic struggle that we've seen since 2004, but there are other major changes to regional commanders, a new theater commanders being added and so forth. we won't know until october 25 when the new committee is announced. as for form policy structure, my own view for a long time is
that it isn't that important in policymaking. it's based frequently among americans on the idea that it plays a role comparable to the secretary of state and the state department of american policy. it's not as important as the basic fact that the foreign minister, so there's that. whether there are broader changes, maybe they are better equipped to respond to this than i am. any comments? >> thanks for your question. anyone else? have we killed all the interest. >> you mentioned that one of your reservations about the first threat was its lack of
policy implications so could you talk about the policy implications in terms of economic reform, the second threat, and what they see as a party operative and tentative. >> yes, the implication of my own revolutionary line was simply that the policy lines of the broader outlines that were laid out at the party last time have guided much of what the leadership has pursued. these are very broad formulations in the political report and they were refined, although still, in many ways ambiguous, and the 60-point decision made by the third, but you could attribute those policy lines directly to a consensus that was established back in 2012 as responses to longer standing issues. how those issues will be addressed this time around is anybody's guess. it's very difficult to see
clear-cut policy differences within the existing leadership over economic policy. there are lots of rumors and stories about differences and central bank people and so forth, but the validity of those differences doesn't stand out very clearly when you look closely at public leadership statements. in the good old day, they wrote a very good book about this in the 80s, it was easy to see a very clear-cut differences. >> it wasn't that easy, i worked hard. >> so the leadership is much more careful about exposing those kinds of differences to public view and what were left with her all the speculations and rumors that some of them may be quite valid and they have a kernel of truth but there separating the week and
that can be really hard. >> what you think. >> i'm basing this mostly on articles and i was with them at a conference in london a week ago and i'm not sure whether it's a matter of policy difference, but they seem to have taken over a large portion of economic decision-making and basically overridden or marginalized and, this is had some not great effects on the economy. >> to have anything to say. >> i've got nothing to say on economic. >> okay. >> question about the secretary which is an often misunderstood institution, but it's often played a very
important role. it seems to me during the first five years it has been put under view that china isn't good at doing much of anything in it brought a bunch of people from inner mongolia. it's hard to see as a power institution but it could be revived depending on who's put in charge of it. it hasn't gotten a lot of attention but it can be and is a very important way of making an unwieldy political process or standing committee chairman work a little more efficiently. i wonder if you could speculate about what you think might happen to that body. >> i can offer my thoughts maybe. the secretary has had a checkered past as you suggest, and when they restored this decision taking process in the institutional components of it in the early '80s from what had been set forth originally
at the 56 congress, the congress, that was basically to set up the structure to have a secondary policy that ratified that of the standing committee and the secretary would be the implement in body that would push those policies through. the length between the two as was the case in 56 would be the member of both the standing committee and also the leader of the secretariat. that secretariat had 11 members, if i remember correctly, and it got trimmed at the 8713th congress to just four. the reason was that the perception was in 8687 that they had use the secretariat to circumvent and usurp prerogative of the committee in making decisions so they crippled that body down to four members. it started to grow again, it
was up and down and now it's back up to six or seven people. it hasn't done a very effective body. i find that surprising given the overall effort to try to revitalize the effectiveness of the centralized party leadership in driving policy. what compensates for it is the assumption of the leading roles of the leading small groups family headed by secretariat members but by standing committee members. unless they change that, i don't see any clear coordination or cohesive role for the secretary and policy and implementation. i think it has to do with mechanics of how you push policies and who's going to do it. is it going to be members of the standing committee or is it going to be members of the secretariat to take their points of departure from the
standing committee. i don't see the impetus to change that. so, it looks like a little bit of a hodgepodge these days, and it's hard to make sense of what exactly it does. i don't know. if you're an advocate, i guess i'm a pessimist. do you have any. >> i basically agree with what you said. right now there are a number of institutional representatives on their as opposed to reflecting a more cohesive policy agenda and that may also reflect differences, i've never seen them as particularly close. i may be wrong on that, but he would rather implement policies through other channels. now, that may be one of the changes we will see at the 19th party congress.
>> anything question. >> i can say the secretary honestly never came up in any of the conversations i've had about leadership until today, so thank you. [laughter] allen and then doug. >> thank you. i wonder if it would be right or not to connect some dots here between the retirement and economic policy, for example. it's often said that the implementation of the anticorruption campaign has really stifled economic initiative. whether there is any view that letting regular order, to take the phrase popular in the city take effect will then allow the anticorruption campaign to assume a lower profile, and therefore maybe give some more impetus even if the local
officials are giving the leeway to do much on their own, because it seems to me unless the party is able to stimulate the economy better than it is doing, they will run into problems doing what you all are saying they want to do. that assumes this revitalized central role. i wonder if there is a reason to connect the dots, if it's coincidental or just wrong thinking. >> my assumption, if it's right or not, is that the anticorruption campaign will continue but it might be much more regular lysed. they're building this comprehensive governance that's supposed to take over some of the cic functions in the organization department, and that will regularize some of the corruption.
it may expand it in some ways because it's only supposed to go after party people and this new state organ could go after nonparty people. but, i understand that the local officials were, a few months ago, criticized for being lazy, and so they better start pumping up local investment. i think they have been paying attention to the lack of local investment. i guess i don't see that as directly related to him either staying or going. >> i'm inclined to agree with that. i think stepping down, they are making complementary steps to institutionalized bureaucracies to perpetuate the campaign in his absence and that may be an invitation to make the anticorruption campaign more regularized over time, but given the push to
enhance the ability of the party apparatus together and become compliant, i doubt that. whether it affects the ability to push innovation and this taking economic policy and all those good things that make a market economy go and so forth , i'm inclined to agree with the contradictory nests of that. you certainly hear stories about people being afraid to make decisions that are going to really push things ahead in the policy direction, but they seem to be satisfied with that. maybe that will doom the effort in the longer run, but we will see. institutionally, i think they're beefing up the bureaucracy so things will continue. >> doug you've been waiting.
>> doug from carnegie endowment. you've been describing a fairly orderly and transparent process over time. how do you explain the sudden axing. here's a candidate to be successor and it's kind of like "game of thrones". because there successor, you have to die and he disappears. what's your attitude on that? >> i don't see why that's a violation. i think that is flatly the effort to raise up somebody among the two people whom i'm projecting will succeed to the standing committee on charges of corruption and get rid of that guy and i want my guy but i don't deny politics goes on, power politics are real, although i think we do it badly. real politics goes on. these are politicians and they play hardball and all that good stuff. they do it within party
processes and institutions and that's a legitimate way to do it. they use corruption charges and disciplinary charges of all sorts. you can build a nice list. i don't see it as contradictory. i don't want back on the list and he was powerful enough to use the campaign to get rid of him and maybe the standing committee. these guys are politicians. in some ways, even thugs but i don't see how that changes their commitment to a set of processes that, if they violate, are going to have significant cost. otherwise, we are returning to cronyism. for example in selection of all the committee members but i think that's a dangerous game. you could do it when china was
weak and poor and under tremendous security threats. you can't do it in a country that's big and powerful like china is now without huge costs pretty quickly. and so, it kind of lends incentive to uphold the system and work within it, rather than outside. >> i guess i tend to see the norms as little more flexible. the seventh party congress and the fourth revolutionary army, june of 1929 when they have their famous fight. they were upholding party norms which somehow coincided with his own personal interests. so, i tend to see the ability of the leadership to inflate party interest with personal mourns as a fairly strong and
honorable party tradition. >> fair enough. other questions in the back. the woman in the back. >> thank you. i have two questions. one is for ms. muller. you mentioned that they have to retire. my question is, did you see any signals that he has to go, other than the reason, do you see any other reason he has to go. the second question is for the professor. you mentioned,. [inaudible] [inaudible] thank you. >> with respect to your first question, i am going on the age norm. principally, i don't see any evidence that he is in any
sort of clinical trouble. some noticed he didn't appear very much this past summer, but he never appears very much in that role. i'm going simply by my projection that it will continue. purely that. >> i see a lot in what the president has been doing including putting power in a cage that seems to resonate with how to be a good communist. that cause for discipline, self cultivation, all these good communist values. rather than saying he's upholding, i think the model, he was the ultimate party guy. i see that as a precedent for what she is doing.
>> thank you very much. i've been an observer since undergraduate days 51 years ago so i'm going to look at this very, very broadly and not with personality specifics. can you comment on a couple of things, one the generational changes, there's a new younger generation that has been getting its education abroad. when will they come into their own and come into power? secondly, in a political philosophy sense, if you could speak very generally without attaching it necessarily to personalities, historical or present, is there any form of what i'll call a jacksonian democrat or the philosophy of jacksonian democracy as opposed to jefferson democracy on one end of the spectrum being discussed in our beds or books or by political
philosophers or professors, and on the other side of that spectrum is the purest brand of modern-day communism. is this stuff being written about, is it present in the political or philosophical dialogues that are going on in contemporary china? >> thank you. >> so by that. >> by analog. only by analog. >> you mean a populism. >> yes, i guess that was as close as we can get to it. is it present today in any of the discourse. >> or is it being suppressed. >> is it thought control. >> there certainly is a degree of populism in china and certainly nationalism, but jackson of course overturned
the first six president, the elitist background of the first six presidents and brought in a very different thing. he created the spoils system, preserved in slavery, he is not my hero. i did not mean it that way. i was trying to see, i was trying to see if there was a referential analogy that you could identify in contemporary china to persons talking about populism to democratize asian. >> i thought that was part of the 2049 old. i've heard that mentioned in the first segment. they already have democracy, at a higher level. >> the critiques that were published, are they published in english? this was mentioned earlier. >> the critique against neoliberalism. >> i think you can find articles in english.
the ones that i'm referring to, there's a set of four books at the academy of social sciences put out this past summer. i may have the only four copies in the united states. >> in english. >> they are not in english. and you only have to read the introduction. they're not very good reading. >> there was an excellent book on political thought, especially in the '90s, it contains the roots of many of the strains of discourse. >> that's exactly what i'm looking for for 2017 going forward. >> in a professional, academic sense. >> well, i'll try to bring in the strains of thought. >> thank you. >> you had a question about leaders of for an education.
i presume by that you mean western education because there's been a whole generation of leaders now gone who were educated in the soviet union who came in the 1990s. in the current leadership john has his advanced education in north korea and a degree in economics, i grant that's an economics degree may be, but your question about whether or not people from the u.s. and the west, i presume is the inspiration for your question, they might be inclined toward liberalism. i think it's apparent that western education and american educations don't necessarily dispose students who study here toward liberal democracy. some of them go back convinced that china has its own way and needs to find its own way and can't copy foreign models and so a western education doesn't necessarily cut one direction
s so, we will see more leaders who have been educated abroad, but i wouldn't expect it necessarily all to shift their political orientation dramatically. >> i remember talking to one of my classes a year or so ago. in this country we tend to debate that issue that they will come over here, get more liberal ideals and go back and change china and others argue that go back and just sit into the system. when i mentioned that, all my chinese student said yes. they understand this is a reprieve or a sabbatical and ultimately they do have to go and fit into a system. that's how you make a living and get by in life. i think that's pretty widely understood. >> i think it's not just a matter of having to fit in, i think sometimes experiences
here can make you feel more patriotic or more appreciative of your system. i think there's a lot of arguments right now to be made about the system not working particularly well. from what i've heard, it gets harder and harder, especially for mid level government to have experiences abroad. i think that's a countervailing force, the ongoing, beyond going to school when you're younger. when you're rising up the ranks, you're not going on these johnson abroad. >> the only one i can think of who studied in the states for a year, maybe not quite that long, and then has risen to very high position, but i would not describe him as a liberal. >> we are out of time, regrettably. i want to thank my comrades for joining this presentation. [applause] we will find out what the answers are in 18 or 19 days.
>> and destroy all the records from this meeting. that's right. thank you all for coming. [inaudible conversations] >> tomorrow night on c-span, former first lady michelle obama in an interview with tv creator and producer shauna rimes. their conversation took place earlier this week at the annual pennsylvania conference for women in philadelphia. here's a portion of the event. >> do you think you have, that women in general have less chances to fail. you feel once, people start labeling you faster than they
label a man ever. >> absolutely. i think that's true for women, minority, i think the bars are different. we experience that all time. we experience better for the past eight years. i joked when i was on the campaign trail, the barges cap moving. you meet it and then it would change and we are seeing that now, quite frankly. the bar -- [laughter] i mean that bar is going places. it is amazing to watch. >> michelle obama interviewed by tv creator and producer shauna rimes tomorrow night at 80 stern on c-span. last weekend the annual democratic steak fry was held in polk county, iowa. they heard from illinois representative sherry bustos and massachusetts representative and kim ryan. this is just over one hour.